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Abstract 
 This article examines the bearing of political philosophy on one’s 
personal behaviour. I review the ‘rich egalitarian problem’ posed by G.A. Cohen 
and consider a variant of this problem called the ‘rich socialist problem’. I argue 
that once we adopt a nuanced view of what adequate fidelity to one’s political 
principles requires there is a satisfactory solution to the rich socialist problem. 
Finally, focusing on Robert Nozick’s highly influential historical entitlement 
theory, I explain the ‘rich libertarian problem’ and explain why, perhaps 
somewhat surprisingly, it is more intractable than the rich socialist problem.  
 
Résumé 
 Cet article analyse l’importance de la philosophie politique pour le 
comportement personnel.  Je passe en revue ‘le problème de l’égalitarien riche’ 
posé par G.A. Cohen et considère un problème analogue ‘le problème du 
socialiste riche’. Je maintiens que dès que nous adoptons un point de vue                                                         
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nuancé sur ce que requiert la fidélité à des principes politiques, il y a une 
solution satisfaisante au problème du socialiste riche. Enfin, me tournant vers la 
théorie très influente de Robert Nozick sur l’habilitation (‘entitlement’) 
historique, je pose ‘le problème du libertarien riche’ et j’explique pourquoi, 
étonnamment, c’est un problème plus difficile à résoudre que celui du socialiste 
riche. 
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 It can be difficult to display fidelity to one’s principles. To paraphrase Tom 
Lehrer, a rich egalitarian may feel a bit like a “Christian Scientist with an appendicitis” 
(Lehrer, 1965, track 6). The egalitarian and Christian Scientist both want something that 
their principles appear to forbid. The Christian Scientist wants an operation that his 
religious commitments condemn as medically unnecessary and impious. The egalitarian 
wants to keep a share of resources that her political principles suggest is not necessary to 
meeting her needs and is unjust.  
 In the concluding chapter of his If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come You’re So 
Rich? G.A. Cohen (2001) addresses the understudied problem of the bearing of political 
philosophy on one’s personal behavior. He considers whether rich self-professed 
egalitarians can reconcile their commitment to distributive equality with their belief that 
it is morally permissible to keep a greater share of resources than they would have under a 
just distribution. Cohen dubs this the ‘rich egalitarian problem’ (Cohen 2001, 177). He 
reviews a variety of possible solutions to the problem but argues that none has sufficient 
justificatory force to solve the problem. Egalitarianism takes many different forms and 
this means that the precise shape of the rich egalitarian problem may vary with the 
specific variety of egalitarianism a rich egalitarian embraces.  For instance, it is likely that 
the demands placed on a person by fidelity to equal opportunity for welfare (Arneson 
1989) will differ from the demands of fidelity to equality of resources (Dworkin 2002) and 
both will differ from fidelity to simple income equality. Similarly, as I explain below, it 
matters whether one conceives the egalitarian conception of justice to which one 
professes allegiance as comprised by a single distributive principle (e.g., equality of 
income) or by a cluster of complementary political ideals about the character of a just 
society.  I think the problem about what fidelity to one’s principles requires is more 
fruitfully explored by considering a variety of egalitarianism that consists in a cluster of 
ideals. So in my discussion, I will examine a variant of the rich egalitarian problem that I 
will call the ‘rich socialist problem’. Socialism, I shall assume, is a normative theory about 
the social and political features of a just society. The rich socialist problem, which I 
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elaborate in greater detail below, asks about the moral status of the personal behavior of a 
person who claims to be committed to socialist ideals yet who enjoys a greater share of 
resources than she believes she would have if society conformed to a socialist conception 
of justice. 
 It is commonly thought the tension between political ideals and personal 
behaviour is particularly acute for rich egalitarians, and perhaps especially for rich 
socialists. However, I will suggest that there is a satisfactory solution to the rich socialist 
problem and that, at least in our unjust world, it is actually the rich libertarian who faces a 
tougher justificatory challenge than the rich socialist. I will proceed as follows. First, I will 
quickly review some salient features of Cohen’s discussion of the rich egalitarian problem 
that are relevant to framing the rich socialist problem. Second, I will explain why features 
of socialist principles furnish at least some rich socialists with an acceptable justification 
for retaining some of their wealth. However, the moral character of the justification is 
nuanced and does not provide unqualified moral vindication of rich socialists. In 
particular, I will argue that it does not follow from the fact that rich socialists do not act 
wrongly by not divesting themselves of the share of resources to which they believe they 
are not justly entitled that rich socialists should not aspire to make their personal 
behaviour more fully harmonize with their egalitarian distributive principles. Third, 
focusing on Robert Nozick’s highly influential historical entitlement theory, I will outline 
the rich libertarian problem and explain why, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it is more 
intractable than the rich socialist problem.  
 
From The Rich Egalitarian Problem to The Rich Socialist Problem 
 
 The rich socialist problem poses a puzzle about the moral justification of one’s 
personal behaviour in relation to the cluster of political principles one espouses as a 
socialist. More specifically, it is a puzzle about the demands of a socialist conception of 
justice on one’s personal conduct. In order to frame the rich socialist problem, it may 
help first to review Cohen’s presentation of the rich egalitarian problem. Cohen’s 
discussion focuses on the apparent tension between an agent professing belief in (some 
variety) of distributive equality as a fundamental demand of justice while simultaneously 
believing that it can be morally  (and politically) acceptable for one to keep a greater than 
equal share of resources. A number of general points are worth making about the 
problem.  
 First, the basic issue concerns the availability of an adequate moral justification of 
personal behaviour rather than the availability of considerations that furnish an excuse for 
personal conduct that is wrong. As Cohen notes the puzzle is not about akrasia (Cohen 
2001, 157). Second, there must be some reasonably determinate answer to the 
counterfactual question of what share of resources an agent who is currently rich would 
have under a more just distribution. In other words, there must be a way of roughly 
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calculating how much the rich egalitarian has in excess of a just share of resources. In 
practice, determination of this excess may prove extremely difficult for a variety of 
reasons but here I will assume that the excess can be identified with sufficient precision 
for us to say with confidence that many rich egalitarians in our world enjoy a fairly large 
excess of resources. (Henceforth I shall simply refer to the share of resources an agent has 
beyond a just share as ‘the excess’ and I will assume rich agents would view the loss of the 
excess as a significant loss.)   
 Third, it must be possible for the rich agent to do something with the excess that 
will plausibly contribute to the advancement of or closer realization of egalitarian 
principles of justice.  For instance, divestment of the excess by a rich agent must make 
some agents who are unjustly disadvantaged somewhat less disadvantaged or it must 
make some difference to advancement of egalitarian political objectives (e.g., by 
improving the electoral prospects of an egalitarian political party.) However, the effect of 
divestment of the excess on the overall degree to which justice is realized need not by 
itself be large. As Cohen argues, the egalitarian case for giving away the excess is not 
undermined simply by the fact that such giving would, in the context, be “a drop in the 
ocean” (Cohen 2001, 161).  Fourth, the moral convictions that generate the problem are 
convictions about justice. So what is sought (if the tension Cohen identifies is to be 
satisfactorily resolved) is an explanation of why considerations of egalitarian justice 
permit a rich agent to keep (at least some) of the excess. 
 Cohen’s presentation of the rich egalitarian problem leaves the precise form of 
egalitarian justice to which the rich egalitarian is committed only vaguely specified. What 
matters to Cohen is only that the rich person affirms a principle of distributive equality 
that implies that the rich person has an excess and could productively give the excess 
away. Cohen suggests that the rich egalitarian problem can be generically formulated by 
considering the apparent tension between the following triad: 
 
A believes in equality. 
A is rich (which means that A does not give a relevant amount of his money away). 
(A believes that) A’s behaviour is not out of line with his own principles. (Cohen 2001, 
157) 
 
 For some varieties of egalitarian justice, especially those that focus narrowly on 
resource distribution, the rich egalitarian problem may well be intractable. However, 
many conceptions of egalitarian justice are defined not by a single, simple principle of 
distributive equality but rather by a constellation of egalitarian commitments that 
include, but are not exhausted by, a principle of distributive equality. In short, a belief in 
equality as a principle of justice may be more complex than Cohen’s generic presentation 
allows. Such is the case, I believe, with a credible socialist conception of egalitarian justice. 
So I propose to frame the rich socialist problem by offering a fuller characterization of the 
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dimensions of a socialist conception of egalitarian justice than Cohen provides in his 
treatment of the rich egalitarian problem in If You’re An Egalitarian, How Come You’re 
So Rich? However, in characterizing the main tenets of socialist justice, I will draw upon 
claims made elsewhere by Cohen about socialist principles. 
 First, following Cohen, we can begin by saying that socialists are committed to a 
complex form of equality of opportunity which “seeks to correct for all unchosen 
disadvantages, disadvantages, that is, for which the individual cannot herself reasonably 
be held responsible whether they be disadvantages that reflect social misfortune or 
disadvantages that reflect natural misfortune” (Cohen 2009, 18). Second, socialists 
endorse a principle of communal reciprocity that limits the extent to which outcomes 
otherwise compatible with equality of opportunity are acceptable (Cohen 2009, 38-39). 
This principle emphasizes the importance of collective commitment to one’s fellow 
members of political community. Third, socialists are committed to a division of moral 
labour such that the realization of equality of opportunity and community reciprocity is 
facilitated primarily through state institutions, laws, and regulations that coordinate 
individual behaviour, meet basic needs and secure for each person a just share of 
resources that they are free to devote to their own projects. As Marx said we seek an 
“association in which the free development of each is a condition of the free development 
of all” (Marx and Engels 1998, 28). The division of moral labour does not mean the 
realization of justice is solely the responsibility of governments. However, socialists can 
embrace Mill’s point that given a suitable institutional background, the facilitation of 
each person’s self-development is usually best achieved by each person focusing their 
attention and energy on advancing their own flourishing and the flourishing of their 
family and friends (Mill 1983, 27).  
 So rather than relying on individuals to coordinate their behaviour in a way that 
secures distributive objectives that facilitate the ‘free development of all’, we set up rules 
and institutions that furnish persons with a just share of resources. Each person is then 
free to devote their share of resources to pursuit of their own life plans and projects. 
Socialism is best achieved through collective action and socialists should be disposed to 
work within, support and rely upon those state institutions and policies that best secure 
distributive equality and community reciprocity. Given satisfactory institutional 
arrangement and social rules, socialist ideals are usually best realized if persons play 
within the rules rather than aiming directly and individually to secure egalitarian 
distributive goals.  
 Fourth, the socialist commitment to equality has a crucial democratic component. 
Just socialist institutions should enjoy democratic legitimacy that reflects the equal 
political standing of persons in political community. In political contexts where there are 
reasonably legitimate democratic processes socialists should pursue egalitarian objectives 
via these processes. That is, they should form non-violent political parties that participate 
in elections and other democratic activities. They should seek to implement socialist 
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ideals by winning the support of the electorate and thereby gaining political power. A 
further important element of the socialist commitment to democracy is recognition of the 
political legitimacy of many non-socialist political results. Where adequate democratic 
systems are in place, socialists should accept as legitimate laws, policies and institutional 
arrangements that are generated through democratic processes when they fall short of or 
even violate socialist requirements of distributive justice or community reciprocity.  This 
does not mean that socialists are bound to accept as legitimate grossly oppressive or 
exploitative arrangements that win the endorsement of a democratic majority. But 
legitimate democratic outcomes can be unjust, from the point of view of socialism, 
without being tyrannical.  
 It is also important to emphasize that a democratic system itself can have 
legitimacy even if it does not fully epitomize a socialist conception of democracy. For 
instance, democratic socialists may hold that democratic ideals would be more fully 
realized through a system with proportional representation than through a single-
member-plurality system. But they can accept that a political party that wins power in a 
reasonably well functioning single-member-plurality system can legitimately form 
government and exercise political power. Similarly, socialists may credibly argue that the 
overall fairness of democratic processes is diminished by significant social and material 
inequalities between citizens of the sort characteristic of most contemporary Western 
democracies. However, once some suitable threshold of political equality is met – e.g., 
that there are free and fair elections in which all adult citizens have an equal vote and in 
which there are decent guarantees of freedom of association, speech and assembly – they 
can accept that democratic processes are legitimate albeit flawed. There is, of course, 
room for debate about the exact conditions that must obtain for a political system to be at 
or above the threshold necessary for legitimacy. Moreover, it’s possible that the legitimacy 
of some (perhaps many) putatively democratic systems is severely compromised by 
economic inequalities that effectively marginalize the views and interests of 
disadvantaged and vulnerable citizens. However, I will proceed on the perhaps optimistic 
assumption that the societies in which the problem of the rich socialist arises are one in 
which the democratic systems in place, though far from perfect, meet the conditions of 
basic legitimacy.2   
 With this brief characterization of socialist justice, the rich socialist problem can 
now be framed. Unlike the rich egalitarian, the rich socialist seeks to display sufficient 
fidelity not simply to a single standard of distributive equality but to the foregoing                                                         
2 Although I cannot supply the requisite supporting evidence here, I think the Canadian democratic system 
currently meets the threshold of basic legitimacy. Even though there are many ways in which Canadian 
democracy could be significantly improved, the current system is sufficiently fair and free for the outcomes 
it generates to have political legitimacy. This is, I hasten to add, quite different from viewing outcomes 
generated by Canadian democracy as just. 
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constellation of principles. So let us suppose that the rich socialist believes in equality of 
opportunity, community reciprocity, the division of moral labour via collective action, 
and democracy. She lives in a reasonably democratic (i.e., legitimate) but non-socialist 
state and she is committed to working within the legitimate though not perfect 
democratic system to achieve socialist reforms to laws, policies and institutions. She 
devotes some of her time, energy, and money to supporting the socialist cause. However, 
the democratically legitimate institutions confer upon her a share of resources that she 
can recognize as excessive (in the sense defined above). She can divest herself of the 
excess in a way that can, very modestly, advance egalitarian distributive objectives. Yet 
keeping the excess, though not a necessary to meeting her needs, contributes to her self-
development3 and loss of the excess would diminish the overall quality of her life. 
Although she devotes a portion of the excess to socialist causes, she does not give all of 
the excess away.4 Our question is whether or perhaps in what sense the rich socialist so 
described is guilty of moral failure. To address this question, we need to consider the 
concept of moral failure in relation to personal behaviour a bit more closely. 
 
Forms of Moral Failure 
 
 The most obvious kind of moral failure occurs when an agent deliberately violates, 
betrays or fails to display sufficient fidelity to an authoritative moral principle. Such 
behaviour we usually characterize as morally wrong or bad. Of course, the bad behaviour 
may be excusable but it is still wrong – i.e., morally impermissible. Commonsense 
morality seems to suggest that conduct that is not wrong is morally permissible. And it 
seems to follow from this point that an agent’s behaviour does not constitute a moral 
failure if it falls into the category of permissible conduct. But we also make distinctions of 
moral appraisal within the category of morally permissible conduct. In particular, we 
characterize some morally permissible conduct as supererogatory. Such behaviour 
achieves (or at least is credibly aimed at) a highly commendable moral outcome but the 
conduct is not obligatory. So although an agent who does not act in such a fashion fails to 
                                                        
3 By this I mean that she can use the excess to advance projects that she values and reasonably views as 
important. For instance, if her conception of the good involves appreciation of art and music, she can use 
her excess to attend excellent concerts and visit great art galleries around the world. Although it is true that 
material resources can be directed towards conspicuous consumption of the sort that contributes nothing 
to genuine human flourishing, the pursuit of many genuine human goods is enhanced by material wealth. I 
assume that the rich socialist can, to some significant degree, lead a genuinely better life by keeping the 
excess than by giving it away.  
4 I assume, without further argument, that the self-professed socialist who does not devote any of her excess 
to advancing socialist justice betrays her principles and acts wrongly. 
74
Socialist Studies / Études socialistes 8 (1) Winter 2012  
  
advance some morally important objective, we do not view the failure to act in a morally 
heroic fashion as an objectionable moral failure.  
 However, our evaluative reactions are, I think, more complex in the range of 
behaviour that is between morally heroic and morally wrong. One type of behaviour is 
what I shall call decent moral behaviour. Decent moral behaviour is morally permissible 
in the sense that it displays sufficient fidelity to relevant moral principles such that we 
would not characterize it as bad or morally wrong.  It is justified by relevant moral 
principles. Yet it somehow falls short of giving full expression to the principles that seem 
applicable to the evaluation of action. We can say of such conduct that it adequately but 
does not fully honour the relevant principles bearing on the moral evaluation of personal 
behaviour. Such behaviour is, from the moral point of view, ‘good enough’ or ‘decent’. It 
is ‘suboptimal’ yet not wrong. In between decent moral behaviour and heroic moral 
behaviour is what I will call good or optimal moral behaviour. This is behaviour that more 
completely honours the principles bearing on the assessment of personal conduct and 
displays a kind of moral excellence lacking in merely decent conduct. It is the sort of 
moral excellence we can reasonably aspire to attain in our personal conduct and we can 
admire and seek to emulate persons whose behaviour is morally optimal. But there are 
boundaries to optimal moral conduct that are exceeded by heroic moral behaviour. The 
latter usually involves special effort or sacrifice that serves laudable moral objectives well 
but which goes beyond what optimal fidelity to moral principles entails.  
 To sum up:  I have distinguished four kinds of moral personal conduct: bad, 
decent, good, and heroic. First, bad conduct fails to display sufficient fidelity to applicable 
moral principles. It is morally impermissible. Second, decent or suboptimal conduct is 
sufficiently commensurate with moral principles to be considered permissible (and hence 
not wrong). But decent conduct does not fully honour the principles relevant to the 
assessment of personal conduct. Third, good or optimal conduct fully honours relevant 
moral principles. Fourth, heroic conduct advances important moral objectives through 
action that can be praised but not reasonably encouraged. Bad conduct constitutes moral 
failure but it’s less clear whether decent conduct should be considered a moral failing. It 
is, at best, a highly qualified form of moral failure that seems more nuanced than the 
moral failing Cohen worries about with regard to the rich egalitarian. Recall that Cohen’s 
worry is that the rich egalitarian acts wrongly or in a morally unjustifiable fashion. 
 If we accept something like this typology we can now consider whether the rich 
socialist I described is guilty of moral failure and more specifically whether the rich 
socialist acts wrongly by failing to give all of her excess away. In order to answer this 
question, we need to consider whether the conduct of the rich socialist displays sufficient 
fidelity to the constellation of principles that comprise the socialist conception of justice. 
Let me concede from the outset that the rich socialist’s behaviour is not good (or optimal) 
in the sense I have outlined. She could more fully honour socialist principles by giving 
more of her excess away. Moreover, we can say it would be laudable but probably not 
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heroic for her to give her excess away. To be heroic, we might expect her to give much 
more than her excess away and to devote herself single-mindedly to political action in the 
name of socialism. But it’s much less clear that the rich socialist dishonours her ideals 
sufficiently for us to view her behaviour as wrong or as a betrayal of her principles. After 
all, she does not endorse the laws and institutions that confer upon her an unequal share 
of resources. She supports democratic activity designed to change them but she also 
acknowledges that the existing laws and institutions are reasonably legitimate from a 
democratic point of view. Moreover, they are not sufficiently unjust, in her view, to 
constitute tyranny. If sufficient numbers of her fellow citizens support democratic reform 
she will, in the spirit of community reciprocity, willingly accept the burdens on her that 
institutional reform will entail. By the same token, in the absence of a broad reciprocal 
commitment from her fellow citizens she is unwilling to shoulder burdens that others like 
her could but do not take on. She is disposed to willingly comply with a democratically 
legitimate division of moral labour necessary to the achievement of socialism. But in the 
absence of such democratic socialist solidarity she is inclined to devote most of the 
resources that the current, democratically legitimate, regime confers upon her to her own 
projects.  Such reluctance to go it (more or less) alone in the pursuit of socialist ideals is 
arguably not especially admirable, but it is not unjustifiable. So in my view, the behaviour 
of the rich socialist is decent, not morally wrong.  
 Her conduct is analogous to the person who plays by the rules of a game that have 
been adopted through a reasonably fair process by the other players of a game. The player 
may believe (correctly) that the rules confer an unfair competitive advantage on him and 
he supports a suitable rule change to remedy this problem. He could, moreover, take 
individual action to mitigate the unfair effect that the current rules has on some other 
players. But he refrains to do so. This player’s conduct does not give the fullest expression 
to the ideal of good sportsmanship but it is not wrong. I would not even call him a poor 
sport. 
 I have suggested that the character of the rich socialist’s fidelity to the 
constellation of socialist principles that constitute the democratic socialist conception of 
justice is sufficiently serious and robust to meet the justificatory burden implicit in 
Cohen’s challenge. An important element of my proposal is that there is a plurality of 
justifiable ways for an agent to respond to and integrate the different facets of one’s 
socialist principles. Of course, the personal behaviour of some self-professed socialists 
will constitute a failure to be sufficiently responsive to socialist principles. Such behaviour 
will be wrong. But within the category of justifiable ways of responding to and integrating 
socialist principles personal behaviour will vary to the degree that it is laudable. Given her 
principles and given the context of a legitimate democratic system, the personal 
behaviour of our rich socialist is justifiable in the sense that it displays adequate 
sensitivity to socialist principles. But this does not mean that it could not be better 
(without being heroic). If this is right we have a partial solution the problem of the rich 
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socialist. It is morally acceptable to be a rich socialist even if it’s morally admirable to be a 
somewhat poorer one. 
 
The Rich Libertarian Problem 
 
 I now want to contrast the situation of the rich socialist with that of the rich 
libertarian. The rich libertarian professes allegiance to Robert Nozick’s version of 
libertarianism. Thus he endorses Nozick’s view that “a minimal state limited to the 
narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and 
so on, is justified; that any more extensive state will violate persons’ rights not to be 
forced to do certain things, and is unjustified; and that the minimal state is inspiring as 
well as right” (Nozick 1974, ix).  He embraces the historical entitlement theory of justice 
according to which inviolable entitlement to property is established through satisfaction 
of the principle of just acquisition provided by the Lockean proviso (Nozick 1974, 178-
182) and through voluntary transfers of justly acquired property (Nozick 1974, 160). He 
believes that the state, no matter what level of popular democratic support it enjoys, 
cannot employ its coercive power to redistribute property in the name of equality or to 
secure public goods. On this view, respect for individual property rights is politically 
paramount and permits only a minimal night watchman state.  Our libertarian agrees 
with Nozick that “a more extensive state violates peoples’ rights” (Nozick 1974, 149). So 
the libertarian repudiates the socialist idea that collective state action can be legitimately 
used to secure equality of opportunity or to promote the common good. This does not 
mean that our libertarian is hostile to all forms of social solidarity favoured by the 
socialist. However, desirable outcomes for the community must be pursued wholly via the 
voluntary actions of individuals. In this respect, the division of moral labour endorsed by 
the libertarian is strongly oriented toward individuals and the voluntary organizations 
they create and away from democratic state action. 
 We may suppose that through luck, talent and hard work our libertarian has done 
well in market transactions and has amassed his share of resources without recourse to 
the use of force, fraud and theft against other property owners. Like the rich socialist, the 
rich libertarian he enjoys a much greater share of resources than most others in his 
society and he is vastly better off than the worse off in his society. He opposes the liberal 
welfare state, even in those respects that benefit him, and lends political support to the 
establishment of a minimal state. However, the rich libertarian also knows the current 
distribution of resources has been significantly affected by a long history of force, fraud 
and theft. Moreover, he knows that the initial assignment of private property rights 
amongst past generations violated the principles of just initial acquisition. For instance, 
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he knows that colonialism and the establishment of slavery5 were gross violations of 
libertarian property rights and he also knows that these, and countless other instances of 
historical injustice, cast a dark shadow over the moral acceptability, from the point of 
view of the historical entitlement theory, of current holdings.  
 In light of these facts, the rich libertarian is highly confident that the current 
distribution of property is tainted and morally suspect. It’s quite possible that he has a 
greater share of resources than he would have had there not been a long history of 
violations of the historical entitlement theory of justice.  He certainly cannot establish 
that the property he currently controls is justly his. Moreover, he is aware that the 
historical entitlement theory requires rectification of violations of the Lockean proviso 
and the principle of justice in transfer. Just like the rich egalitarian or rich socialist, the 
rich libertarian can identify, with reasonable determinacy, an excess. He thinks Nozick 
provides a reasonable way of identifying this:  
 
lacking much historical information, and assuming (1) that victims of 
injustice generally do worse than they otherwise would and (2) that those 
from the least well-off group in society have the highest probability of 
being the (descendants) of victims of the most serious injustice who are 
owed compensation by those who benefitted from the injustices (assumed 
to be those better off, though sometimes the perpetrators will be others in 
the worst-off group), then a rough rule of rectifying the injustices might 
seem to be the following: organize society so as to maximize the position 
of whatever group ends up least well-off in the society (Nozick 1974, 231). 
 
 The perhaps surprising implication of a libertarian principle of rectification of this 
sort is that material inequalities in our world are presumptively unjust.6 So a reasonable 
approximation of the rich libertarian’s excess, is the amount of resources he has above                                                         
5 Nozick does not discuss specific examples of historical injustice in any detail but concedes, as any 
reasonable person must, that there have been grave injustices that are relevant to assessment of current 
property rights. On the example of American slavery, he cites with approval Boris Bittker’s The Case for 
Black Reparations (New York: Random House 1973), (Nozick 1974: 344, n 2). 
6 Where there is inequality, some persons are worse off than others and this raises the issue of whether 
redistribution can improve their situation. Of course, as Rawls pointed out in discussion of the difference 
principle, there can be cases in which inequalities work to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged. 
This adds some complexity to proper calculation of the ‘excess’ of the rich libertarian because we might 
discover that the maintenance of some inequalities works to the benefit of the worst-off. But we can 
suppose that the principle of rectification presumptively favours distributive equality and that this 
presumption can be overridden in the special case in which inequality is to the advantage of the least 
advantaged.  
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what he would have if resources were equally distributed. Moreover, given Nozick’s 
plausible speculation about the probable effects on the descendants of the victims of 
historical injustice, it makes sense for the rich libertarian to view people in the worst-off 
group as those to whom compensation is most likely owed. By forming the judgement 
that the worst-off are unjustly deprived of resources, the rich libertarian does not appeal 
to non-libertarian considerations. Rather he accepts the logic of his own principles of 
historical entitlement and makes a reasonable judgement about what kind of rectification 
for violations of the principles of acquisition and transfer is appropriate in current 
circumstances.7 The theory requires him to acknowledge the influence that historical 
injustice has had on current property holdings and to find a way in which ugly legacy of 
historical injustice can be neutralized. The rich libertarian can divest himself of his excess 
and although he cannot alone fully remedy the injustice, he can materially improve the lot 
of the worst-off and move his society somewhat closer to the allocation of private 
property rights required by the historical entitlement theory.  
 However, unlike the rich socialist, the rich libertarian does not believe that 
democratically authorized collective state action can be legitimately employed to 
redistribute resources. By contrast, he believes in the minimal night watchman state. The 
rich libertarian realizes that many of his fellow rich libertarians have, as determined by 
their own principles of justice, an unjust share of resources but he also knows that most of 
them will not give their excess away. In effect, the constellation of principles to which the 
rich libertarian claims allegiance do not permit him to appeal to the democratic 
legitimacy of the unjust property regime nor can he work towards the implementation of 
a democratically imposed system of redistribution because his principles forbid the kind 
of democratic collective action involved in government taxation. After all, taxation, on his 
view, is a disguised form of forced labour (Nozick 174, 169). And even if his principles, 
permitted some coercive state action in the name of a principle of rectification, he 
                                                        
7 I assume we cannot offer a precise answer to the impossibly complex counterfactual question of exactly 
who would have exactly what share of resources if the principles of justice in acquisition and transfer had 
been respected throughout history. It’s possible, though not epistemically ascertainable, that some who are 
well off now would have been even better off were it not for the legacy of historical injustice. Similarly, it’s 
possible, though again not epistemically ascertainable, that some who are relatively poor now would have 
been even poorer if libertarian principles had been respected. However, we do know enough about the long 
history of grave violations of libertarian principles to credibly believe that the current distribution of 
property is sufficiently morally tainted to throw into question, from a libertarian point of view, current 
property holdings. Since we know this and since we cannot coherently reconstruct history with a view to 
determining what a just distribution of property is now, the libertarian has no recourse but to formulate a 
rough principle of rectification along the lines sketched by Nozick. So it is the libertarian’s own account of 
rectification that permits him to identify the excess to which he cannot claim an entitlement. 
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believes that the creation of the coercive state necessary to effect redistribution8 is deeply 
regrettable. Moreover, he realizes that his fellow citizens do not politically support such 
an option. Whereas the rich socialist has some reason to think it is acceptable for her to 
keep her excess, the principles of the rich libertarian seem to condemn his keeping his 
unjust excess. He should no more keep his excess than he should keep property that he 
knows to be stolen. (The excess is like stolen property in the sense that it is property to 
which one does not have just entitlement and it is property to which others can claim just 
entitlement. The principle of rectification implies both that a rich person is not entitled to 
the excess and that others (i.e., those who are the worst off) can lay claim to it.) So it 
seems that minimal fidelity to the libertarian principles requires him to give the excess to 
the worst-off, even if other similarly situated rich libertarians refuse to do so.  
 With this argument in place, we can now try to situate the conduct of the rich 
libertarian who keeps his excess in the framework of moral behavior I sketched earlier. 
His conduct is certainly not supererogatory. Morally heroic action in the name of 
libertarian principles would require the libertarian to make dramatic sacrifices of his own 
well being in order to improve the situation of the worst-off.  Similarly, we cannot 
characterize his conduct as good since full fidelity to his principles would require the 
libertarian to fully divest himself of his excess and to work tirelessly to persuade others to 
do so. But it is also difficult to characterize his conduct as decent since, unlike the rich 
socialist, the constellation of principles to which the libertarian subscribes provide no 
basis on which to resist the demand to divest himself of his excess. The force of the 
imperative to divest is located in the normative primacy of property rights on which 
libertarianism is predicated. The rich libertarian knows that he has in his possession 
property to which others have a right. So by keeping his excess, he violates the rights of 
others9 and conduct that violates rights must be wrong. In a sense the rich libertarian is 
condemned by the simplicity of a theory that treats property rights as normatively basic 
and inviolable. 
Given the plausible premises about the legacy of historical injustice on current property 
distribution, the rich libertarian problem actually seems more intractable than the rich                                                         
8 The redistribution of resources sanctioned by the theory does not appeal to a ‘patterned principle of 
distributive justice’ of the sort rejected by libertarians (Nozick 1974, 150-160). Rather redistribution would 
take the form of the reestablishment of property rights of the sort that roughly parallels the return of stolen 
property to rightful owners.   
9 There may be some epistemic indeterminacy about the identity of those among the worse off whose 
property rights are violated. But from a libertarian point of view, one cannot claim an entitlement to 
property that is not yours simply on the grounds that you do not know exactly to whom it really belongs. 
The principle of rectification may only provide approximate guidance about such matters. But if we are 
guided by it, persons with a less than equal share of resources can claim that those with more than an equal 
share have some of the resources to which the disadvantaged are entitled. 
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socialist problem. Cohen rightly pressed the rich egalitarian problem. Even if I am right, 
rich democratic socialists should not be morally complacent or smug about their wealth.  
Their conduct may be decent but it is not good. But in the spirit of Cohen’s earlier critical 
work on libertarianism, I conclude with the following question that is, I believe, harder 
than the parallel question posed to socialists: If you’re a libertarian, how come you’re so 
rich?10 
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10 Like so many other political philosophers, I learned a great deal from G.A. Cohen. So I would like to 
dedicate this essay to his memory. For helpful discussion and feedback, I would like to thank Matthew 
Clayton, Avigail Eisenberg, Alistair Macleod, David Schmidtz, Andrew Williams, Jan Zwicky and two 
anonymous referees for the journal. I would also like to thank Jan Narveson for organizing the symposium 
in honour of Cohen at which I presented the initial version of this essay. 
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